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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
JONES, District Judge. 
 On April 27, 2011, Cynthia A. Siwulec (“Appellant” or “Siwulec”) filed a Notice 
of Appeal with the Court challenging the District Court of New Jersey‟s order dismissing 
her amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  For the 
reasons stated below, we shall reverse the order of the District Court and remand for 
further proceedings. 
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I. Factual Background1 
On about May 10, 2010, Siwulec, a resident of Rumson, New Jersey, was visited 
at her residence by a representative of J.M. Adjustment Services, LLC (“JMAS”) and 
handed an envelope containing a letter from Chase, her lender.  The letter sought 
information from Siwulec to assist Chase in “resolv[ing]” a home mortgage loan that 
Chase alleged was “past due.”  Appellant alleged that the information requested by the 
letter was to be used to collect her outstanding debt.  Siwulec notes that the home 
mortgage loan was obtained for personal, family or household purposes to pay for a 
residence, and was not a loan secured for business purposes. 
After accepting the letter from JMAS‟ field agent, Siwulec noticed that the agent 
had dropped additional documents on her lawn.  She claimed that the dropped or 
discarded documents contained standard instructions and procedures provided by JMAS 
to its agents.  Siwulec also asserted that at no point during the interaction between herself 
and JMAS‟ agent was she provided with any of the disclosures required by the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).  15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692e(11) (mandating that 
debt collectors disclose original creditor, details of debt, and fact that any information 
provided will be used to collect debt).  Finally, she highlighted that on its website, JMAS 
                                              
1
 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from Appellant‟s 
amended complaint.  Moreover, because we write primarily for the parties, we shall only 
provide a brief recitation of the facts below, supplementing our analysis with additional 
details as necessary. 
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claimed to be in “Full compliance with FDCPA and [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] 
requirements.” 
II. Procedural History 
Siwulec filed her original complaint against JMAS on August 14, 2010.  JMAS 
filed a motion for a more definite statement on November 22, 2010.  Siwulec responded 
by filing an amended class action complaint alleging a single claim under the FDCPA, 15 
U.S.C. § 1692g, on behalf of herself and a class of more than fifty (50) natural persons in 
New Jersey or New York.  She alleged that JMAS had violated the FDCPA by failing to 
make the disclosures it requires of all debt collectors.  Subsequently, JMAS filed its 
motion to dismiss on January 5, 2011.  Following full briefing on the motion, the District 
Court issued a memorandum and order on April 1, 2011 granting the motion to dismiss.  
It found that the services provided by JMAS qualified it as a messenger for Chase, rather 
than a debt collector in its own right.  It was therefore not required to provide FDCPA-
required disclosures on its own behalf. 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Siwulec‟s claim under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction over Siwulec‟s appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
This Court exercises plenary review of a district court‟s grant of a motion to 
dismiss.  Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  “When 
considering an appeal from a dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we 
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accept as true all well-pled factual allegations.”  Santiago v. GMAC Mort. Grp, Inc., 417 
F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005).  Moreover, we “construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 224.  In resolving 
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally should consider only the 
allegations in the complaint, as well as “documents that are attached to or submitted with 
the complaint, . . . and any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, 
items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in 
the record of the case.”  Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 
2006) (marks and citations omitted). 
 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading 
requirements of Rule 8(a).  Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, “in order to give 
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”  
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain “sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
--- U.S. ---, ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).  To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that “raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level . . . .”  Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 
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2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  Accordingly, to satisfy the plausibility 
standard, the complaint must indicate that a defendant‟s liability is more than “a sheer 
possibility.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.  “Where a complaint pleads facts that are „merely 
consistent with‟ a defendant‟s liability, it „stops short of the line between possibility and 
plausibility of entitlement to relief.‟” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
 Under the two-pronged approach articulated in Twombly and later formalized in 
Iqbal, a district court must first identify all factual allegations that constitute nothing 
more than “legal conclusions” or “naked assertions.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557.  
Such allegations are “not entitled to the assumption of truth” and must be disregarded for 
purposes of resolving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.  Next, the 
district court must identify “the „nub‟ of the . . . complaint – the well-pleaded, 
nonconclusory factual allegation[s].”  Id.  Taking these allegations as true, the district 
judge must then determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief.  See 
id. 
However, “a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely 
that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.”  Phillips, 
515 F.3d at 231 (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65, 1969 n.8).  Rule 8 “does not 
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for 
enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the 
necessary element.”  Id. at 234. 
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IV. Discussion 
The primary issue before the Court is whether the District Court erred in 
concluding that JMAS does not qualify as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA and 
therefore need not make the disclosures required by that act.  The FDCPA defines “debt 
collector” as: 
any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the 
mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any 
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. . . .  
 
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  As the lower court recognized, the purpose of the FDCPA is “to 
eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt 
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 
disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt 
collection abuses.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  Although this Court has held that “[a] threshold 
requirement for application of the FDCPA is that the prohibited practices are used in an 
attempt to collect a „debt,‟” Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Grp., 834 F.2d 1163, 1167 (3d 
Cir. 1987), the first determination must be whether the entity alleged to be engaged in the 
debt collection activity regularly collects debt or whether debt collection is the principal 
purpose of its business. 
In finding that JMAS was not a debt collector, the District Court erred in two 
respects.  First, it concentrated on whether JMAS‟s activities had been deceptive, 
although the FDCPA‟s definition of debt collector makes no reference to that inquiry.  It 
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stated that the “debt collection activity in this case pales by comparison to the deceptive 
activity” in a Ninth Circuit FDCPA case and that “facts alleged by Plaintiff do not 
indicate that [JMAS] used deceptive or harassing means of delivering Chase‟s message.”  
(App. 25-26) (citing Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 155 F.3d 1142 (9th 
Cir. 1998).  This logic relies upon a kind of circular reasoning at odds with the FDCPA 
itself.  The FDCPA mandates that all debt collectors make disclosures, regardless of 
whether they engage in deceptive practices, as a safeguard against deception.  Whether or 
not a debt collector acts deceptively is clearly not part of what makes it a debt collector 
subject to the FDCPA‟s requirements. 
The District Court‟s second logical error is perhaps more troubling.  In 
determining whether JMAS is an indirect debt collector, it focused almost exclusively on 
the actions that Siwulec alleged JMAS took with respect to her, although the statutory 
definition of debt collector turns on “the principal purpose” of a business and/or the 
“regular[ ] collect[ion] of debts.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).2  The District Court noted that 
the JMAS representative is alleged to have taken just two actions with respect to Siwulec: 
the delivery of the letter and the dropping of the instructions on her lawn.  (App. 24.)  It 
noted that Siwulec had not alleged that JMAS “sought or obtained [ ] information about 
her property or her personal contact information, or that JMAS conveys such information 
                                              
2
 Congress stated that “the requirement that debt collection be done „regularly‟ 
would exclude a person who collects debt for another in an isolated instance, but would 
include those who collect for others in the regular course of business.”  S. Rep. No. 95-
382, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697-98. 
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to lenders.”  (Id. at 25.)  It then concluded that “the alleged delivery of the Chase letter 
would be nothing more than messenger service” and that JMAS therefore did not fall 
within the purview of the FDCPA.  (Id. at 26-27.) 
Siwulec alleges much more with regard to the principal purpose of JMAS‟s 
business than its actions with respect to her.  Her complaint includes statements from 
JMAS‟s website promoting its services to debt collectors and advertising its compliance 
with the FDCPA.  She also includes the text of the instructions dropped on her lawn, 
which make clear that JMAS contracted with Chase to gather information both from 
alleged debtors and through its own on-site investigation of their properties.  These 
allegations are well-pled and we must accept them as true.  Santiago, 417 F.3d at 386. 
Given the facts as alleged, JMAS is no mere messenger service for debt collectors.  
Compare Udis v. Universal Comms. Co., 56 P.3d 1177 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (finding 
Romine persuasive on interpretation of Colorado‟s analogous FDCPA and holding that a 
company that markets its services gathering debtor contact-information to debt collectors 
is covered by the Act) with Laubach v. Arrow Serv. Bureau, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 625, 631-
32 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that printing and mailing of collection letters on behalf of 
debt collector did not render mailing company debt collector for FDCPA purposes).  In 
addition to delivering letters, JMAS representatives are instructed to urge alleged debtors, 
in person, to call the creditor while they watched.  They were to gather contact 
information from the debtors directly, to speak with their neighbors, and to conduct a 
visual assessment of their properties.  These activities bring JMAS out of any messenger 
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exception and into the coverage of the FDCPA, which was certainly intended to regulate 
in-person debt collection visits. 
 Consequently, we find that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that JMAS 
was a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA because the principal purpose of JMAS‟s 
business is the collection of debts and JMAS regularly engages in indirect debt collection.  
The District Court‟s subsequent dismissal of the case was therefore in error based on a 
plain reading of the well-pled facts in the amended complaint. 
V. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the order of the District Court 
dismissing Siwulec‟s amended complaint.  We shall remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
